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The purpose of this article is to evaluate the role of the German Federal Constitutional 
Court (BVerfG) as an institutional actor which has been instrumental in the German 
debate concerning European integration and the doctrine of sovereignty in the light of one 
case in particular, namely, the so-called Banana Case. The analytical framework within 
which the role and the position of the state in the process of European Integration is 
customarily interpreted by the main protagonists of the German academic debate will be 
assessed. References to the previous cases concerning European Integration decided by 
the BVerfG shall be made for the purposes of the discussion only. In particular, it will be 
examined to what extent, if at all, there is a corollary between the concept of a unitary, 
homogenous state and a juridical debate concerning European integration which its 
proponents seek to ensure is also unitary and homogenous as opposed to being able to 
accommodate a plurality of views. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Law is a normative order that is customarily understood in terms of a hierarchy.
1 
In the German legal system, for example, the hierarchy consists of the Basic Law, Federal 
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Law and State Law. European Community (EC) law may also be understood according to 
a hierarchical model to the extent that, as the catechism provides, it prevails over national 
law
2 and consists of primary and secondary sources of law arranged according to a 
hierarchy of precedence or Anwendungsvorrang. The implications for state sovereignty 
are considerable, particularly given the growing number of substantive EC law subject 
matters, which traditionally resided within the exclusive competence of the member 
states, but which now have been pooled through Europeanization. Immigration law
3 and 
policy,
4 is a case in point; the single currency is another.
5 In effect, member states no 
longer have absolute sovereignty over these issues in the sense envisaged by the Treaty of 
Westphalia.
6 The constitutional courts of the respective member states, however, are still 
in the process of coming to terms with this decline in sovereignty.
7 Indeed, the 
constitutional courts asinfluential actors in the integration process have, in their own way, 
contributed to the politicization of the sovereignty debate and have helped to perpetuate 
the view of the age of absolute sovereignty as ‘paradise lost’.
8  
                                                                                                                                                  
 
1  Through, for example, the doctrine of precedent housed in the English legal system or the 
Anwendungsvorrang in German law. See Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (Max Knight, trans.,1967) 
(1960). 
 
2  Costa v. ENEL, Case 6/64, 1964 E.C.R. 585. However, this principle has been qualified by the 
Maastricht judgement of the German Constitutional Court. See Entscheidungen des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BverfGE] 89, 155. 
 
3  See generally Jörg Monar, Justice and Home Affairs in the Treaty of Amsterdam: Reform at the 
Price of Fragmentation 23 E. L. Rev. 320 (1998). Bernd Marschang, Mißtrauen, Abschottung, Eigensinn - 
Entwicklungslinien der europäischen Asylrechts » harmonisierung « bis zum Amsterdamer Vertrag, 
Kritische Justiz 69 (1998). Ralph Göbel-Zimmermann & Thorsten Masuch, Regelungsbedarf für eine 
Einwanderungsgesetzgebung ?, 31 Zeitschrift für Rechtspolitik 435 (1998). Andreas Zimmermann, Der 
Vertrag von Amsterdam und das deutsche Asylrecht, 17 Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 450 (1998). 
Kay Hailbronner & Claus Thiery, Amsterdam - Vergemeinschaftung der Sachbereiche Freier 
Personenverkehr, Asylrecht und Einwanderung sowie Überführung des Schengen-Besitzstands auf EU-
Ebene, 5 Europarecht 583 (1998). 
 
4  See Challenges to the Nation-State: Immigration in Western Europe and North America (Christian 
Joppke ed., 1998). See also Gallya Lahav, Immigration and the State: the Devolution and Privatisation of 
Immigration Control in the EU, 24 J. Ethnic and Migration Stud. 675 (1998).  
 
5  See Legal Framework of the Single European Currency (Paul Beaumont and Neil Walker eds., 
1999). 
 
6  Arising from the Treaties of Westphalia (1648). See Andrew Linklater, The Transformation of 
Political Community: Ethical Foundations of the Post-Westphalian Era (1998). 
 
7  See for example the French Conseil Constitutionnel’s decisions concerning the Maastricht Treaty 
and the Treaty of Amsterdam: ‘Maastricht I’ decision from April 9, 1992, Nr. 92 - 308 DC, and also 
Decision Nr. 97 - 394 DC, Journal officiel de la République Française from January 3, 1998, 165 et seq. 
(AJDA, 186 et seq., 1998). See generally Susan Millns, The Treaty of Amsterdam and Constitutional 
Revision in France, 5 EPL 61 (1999) and also Anne Bonnie, The Constitutionality of Transfers of 
Sovereignty: the French Approach, 4 EPL 517 (1999). 
 
 
8  See John Milton, Complete Poems and Major Prose (Merritt Y. Hughes ed., 1957).   3
The issue of loss informs much of the debate concerning the project of European 
integration and sovereignty, which at the micro-level represents an illustration of the 
effects of the macro-level of globalization.
9  With regard to sovereignty and the EU, loss 
has also been instrumentalized by some who seek to initiate what in law is sometimes 
referred to as a ‘claw back’ process or, to draw from Milton yet again, to regain that 
which has been ‘lost’.
10 In the light of European integration and the increasing 
interdependence between states,
11 others take a more pragmatic view of the sovereignty of 
the nation-state as being ‘pooled’
12 at the supra-national level.
13 
   Law has played a part in both scenarios; it has been instrumentalized to reflect 
both views of the role of the nation-state in European Integration. Indeed, the concept of 
the nation-state is a vital premise of the legal reasoning that forms the basis of the 
incorporation of EC law into the jurisdictions of the member states. The underlying 
tension is as follows: either a state’s membership in the EU entails categorical acceptance 
of the supremacy doctrine, which is in itself, an endorsement of the hierarchical model of 
law; or the state retains the right to set the supremacy doctrine aside in certain situations. 
Thus, even if a member state accepts that its sovereignty is qualified by its membership in 
the EU, it is by no means an unconditional qualification. These two positions represent 
two versions of the relationship between EC law and national law and, in the context of 
Germany, two competing schools of thought in the juridical debate concerning European 
integration. The term ‘German juridical debate’ is used to denote the legal academic 
community,
14 which, in contrast to the academic communities of other member states of 
                                                 
 
9  See, e.g., Saskia Sassen, Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization (1996). 
 
10   Thus, for example, the sovereignty debate in the United Kingdom resolved ostensibly by the 
Factortame decision (See Regina v. Secretary of State for Transport, Ex Parte Factortame Ltd. [1990] 2 
A.C. 85. See also Regina v. Secretary of State for Transport, Ex Parte Factortame Ltd. (No2) [1991] A.C. 
603) which must, however, be qualified by the ultimate reservation that the UK can still ‘reclaim’ 
sovereignty by a repeal of the European Communities Act 1972. 
 
11   See, e.g., the concept of interdependence sovereignty espoused in Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: 
Organized Hypocrisy (1999). 
 
12   Neil MacCormick, The Maastricht-Urteil: Sovereignty Now, 1 Eur. Law J. 259 (1995). See also Neil 
MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty: Law, State, and Nation in the European Commonwealth (1999). 
 
13   See Jürgen Schwarze, Concept and Perspectives of European Community Law, 5 EPL . 227, at 236 
(1999) and also Dieter Grimm, Die Zukunft der Verfassung in Zum Begriff der Verfassung: Die Ordnung 




14   Kokott refers to this as La Doctrine which, in her opinion, is composed of professors of public, 
European, and international law including former and future justices. See Juliane Kokott, Report on 
Germany, in The European Courts and National Courts: Doctrine and Jurisprudence 77, 79 (Anne-Marie 
Slaughter et al. eds., 1998).   4 
the EU, acts as a source of influence on the jurisprudence of the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht or German Federal Constitutional Court (“BVerfG”),
15 which 
in turn has considerable influence on the European integration process. On the one hand, 
the role of the court should not be overstated, particularly given the institutional 
constraints placed on judges. On the other, it is the role of the national constitutional 
courts of the member states of the EU to articulate the relationship between EC law and 
national law in an ongoing debate, characterized by shifting normative relationships that 
are predicated on the issue of the fundamental legitimacy of political power.   
 
 
II.  SOVEREIGNTY AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY POST-1945 
 
Germany had a unique status under public international law after the Second 
World War.
16 Subsequent to the German capitulation on May 8, 1945, the Four Powers 
(France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States) assumed the 
supreme authority in Germany as provided by the Allied Declaration of June 5, 1945.
17 In 
effect, the military commanders of the four Allies administered their respective zones 
independently, but acted jointly through the Inter-Allied Control Council with regard to 
all matters that related to the country as a whole.
18 The “Settlement Convention”
19 was 
                                                 
 
15   Indeed, the extent of the influence exercised by German legal academia on judicial decisions may be 
regarded as surprising by common law lawyers. It is often the case in Germany that judges are also 
academics. See id. at 79. Historically, universities have played an important role in the development and the 
systemisation of German law. Academic opinion, outlined in periodicals and commentaries (Kommentare) 
is regarded as persuasive authority. This is in direct contrast to the position in common law jurisdictions. 
Lord Goff’s dicta in Spiliarda Maritime Corp. v. Cansulex Ltd. [1987] A.C. 460, 488 notwithstanding. The 
position in Scotland can be distinguished on the grounds that it is more common to cite opinions of 
academics, which may influence the outcome of litigation. 
 
16   See case of Prince Hans-Adam II of Liechtenstein v. Germany (European Court of Human Rights, 
Application no. 42527/98), Judgment of July 12, 2001 at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/Hudoc1doc2\HEJUD\200108\hans-adam%20ii%20 
%2042527jnv.gc%2012072001e.doc (last visited 10/8/02), in which Germany’s position under public 
international law is outlined.  This section draws from M Aziz, ‘Sovereignty über Alles : (Re)Configuring 
the German Legal Order’in Neil Walker (ed) Sovereignty in Transition, Hart Publishing 2002 
(Forthcoming). 
 
17   Declaration  regarding the defeat of Germany and the assumption of supreme authority in Germany 
and the assumption of supreme authority with respect to Germany by the Governments of the United States 
of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the Provisional Government 
of the French Republic, June 5, 1945, 68 U.N.T.S. 190. 
 
 
18   Such as military matters, transport, finance, economic affairs, reparations, justice, prisoners of war, 
communications, law and order as well as political affairs.   5
designed to end the Occupation Regime.
20 Article 1 of Schedule I of the Settlement 
Convention provides that the Federal Republic of Germany is accorded “the full authority 
of a sovereign State over its internal and external affairs”.
 21  However, Article 2 provides 
that the Three Powers retain their rights “relating to Berlin and to Germany as a whole, 
including the reunification of Germany and a peace settlement.” 
22 
The Settlement Convention had a considerable impact on the administration of 
justice. For example, whereas the Federal and the Land authorities were given powers to 
repeal or amend legislation enacted by the Occupation Authorities, rights and obligations 
created or established under legislative, administrative or judicial action of the 
Occupation Authorities remained valid for all purposes under German law.
23 
Furthermore, German courts were barred from prosecuting individuals who sympathized 
with or aided the Three Powers or their Allies. This limitation on German jurisdiction was 
intended to ensure that acts undertaken by the Allies during the German occupation were 
not questioned retroactively.
24 In order to regain the full status of a sovereign state, 
Germany had to accept such restrictions on the jurisdiction of its courts both in 1954 and 
in 1990. To quote a decision of the European Court of Human Rights in July of this 
year,
25 Germany had “no choice.” Indeed, the limitation of Germany’s jurisdiction was 
absolute and a force majeur.
26  
                                                                                                                                                  
 
19   The Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War and the Occupation (hereinafter 
the Settlement Convention), which was one of the “Bonn Conventions” signed by France, the United States 
of America, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany at Bonn on May 26, 1952. See 
Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War and the Occupation, May 26, 1952, 6 
U.S.T. 4411 and Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil II (BGBl. II), v. 31.3.1955 at 405 et seq.  
 
20   The Bonn Conventions did not enter into force but were amended in accordance with the five 
Schedules to the Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of 
Germany which was one of the “Paris Agreements” which were signed in Paris on October 23, 1954. See 
Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of the Federal Republic of Germany, October 23, 
1954, 6 U.S.T. 5707. 
 
21   See the Settlement Convention, supra note 19. 
 
22   See the Settlement convention, supra note 19.  
 
23   The same applied to rights and obligations arising under treaties or international agreements which 
had been concluded on behalf of the three Western Zones of Occupation by the Occupation Authorities or 
by the Governments of the Three Powers. See the Settlement Convention, art. II, § 2. 
 
24  This exclusion was maintained in the Exchange of notes constituting an agreement concerning the 
Convention on relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany of 26 May 1952 
and the Convention on the settlement of matters arising out of the war and the occupation of 26 May 1952 
[Agreement of September 27/28], September 27 & 28, 1990, 1656 U.N.T.S. 30, following the Treaty on 
Final Settlement with Respect to Germany [Two-Plus-Four-Treaty], Sept. 12, 1990, 1696 U.N.T.S. and 
Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I (BGBl. I),v. 9.13.1990 at 1308 et seq. 
 




26  Id.   6 
One of the basic principles of medieval theories of sovereignty is par in parem 
imperium non habet (an equal cannot exercise power and jurisdiction over an equal),
27 
which refers to the authority of a ruler to change, promulgate, or abolish law in the 
jurisprudence of the Ius commune.
28 This principle was reformulated in the 19
th Century 
during the period of state formation when the power of the state to regulate all its matters 
was considered paramount.
29 The sovereign power to administer justice remains a central 
concern in German administrative law, just as the emphasis placed by some German 
constitutional lawyers on the unity of the state
30 has been transposed from constitutional 
law into the debates concerning German administrative law. 
In 1990 the Four Powers negotiated to end the reserved rights of the Four Powers 
in Berlin and Germany as a whole. The Treaty on the Final Settlement with respect to 
Germany (the so-called “Two-Plus-Four Treaty”) signed in Moscow on September 12, 
1990 confirmed the borders of the united Germany (Article 1), ended the rights and 
responsibilities of the Four Powers relating to Berlin and to Germany (Article 7) and in 
effect gave Germany full sovereignty over its internal and external affairs.
 31  The shift 
from Germany having what was referred to in 1955 as the “rights inherent in a sovereign 
state” to Germany being referred to as a “sovereign state” gave rise to a distinction 
between de facto and de jure sovereignty.
32 Calhoun draws a parallel distinction between 
sovereignty and the exercise of sovereign rights, which he bases on the divisibility of 
sovereign rights.
33 Calhoun recognizes that a division of powers is not necessarily 
sovereignty’s undoing; he does, however, expressly refute the notion of a divided 
sovereignty.
34 Sovereignty was noticeably linked to state building in Germany, but the 
19
th century approach of tying sovereignty to the state was reversed in the 20
th century. 
Thus, the sovereign powers ordinarily accorded to a state were not accorded to Germany 
                                                 
 
27   See Guido’s second part of his Gloss in which he commentates Justinian’s Digest.  
 
28   Note that Nec magistratibus and Tempestiuum were two of the loci classici where the jurists 
discussed this doctrine of legislative sovereignty. 
 
29   See Oliver Lepsius, Steuerungsdiskussion, Systemtheorie und Parlamentarismuskritik, at 17 et seq 
(1999). 
 
30  See Joseph Isensee, Staat und Verfassung in Joseph Isensee & Paul Kirchhof, Handbuch des 
Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, § 13 (Heidelberg, 1987). [hereinafter Handbuch des 
Staatrechts] 
 
31   See Two-Plus-Four-Treaty, supra note 24. The Treaty entered into force on March 15, 1991. 
 
32 Which is referred to in German as faktische or rechtliche Souveränität. 
 
33 This is not to be confused with divided sovereignty. See Franz C. Mayer, Kompetenzüberschreitung 
und Letztentscheidung, at 286 et seq. (2000). 
   7
after 1945. Several observations can be made: the more “independent” Germany became 
from the Allies, the more sovereignty it regained; the more important sovereignty became 
to the community of German jurists, the more a tension became visible in the legal debate 
on the effects of European integration. Furthermore, sovereignty was not vested in the 
state, but as Article 20(2) of the Basic Law provides, in the people.
35 The main 
characteristics of a sovereign state have customarily been held to be its territory, its 
people and its government.
36 The German example is interesting because the territory was 
contested (particularly with regard to the existence of the German Democratic Republic), 
and the powers of the German Government were constrained by the Allies. In contrast, 
the sovereign right to define the German people remained untouched. As the discussions 
concerning dual citizenship have shown, the fact that citizenship was one area over which 
the Federal Republic was accorded sovereignty is one reason why citizenship is 
considered so important in Germany. 
 
Sovereignty has never been taken for granted in Germany, on the contrary, it has always 
been questioned and contested.
37 Sovereignty has always been desired in Germany 
because it is seen as unattainable. If one can legitimately speak of ‘desiring sovereignty’ 
in the German context, then it makes sense to distinguish two forms of desire. Either one 
desires something that one once had but has lost, or one desires something that one never 
possessed; both forms of desire are predicated on aspiration. In the case of Germany, 
reclaiming or claiming sovereignty
38 – whichever way one chooses to look at it – has 
traditionally been aspired to by German constitutional lawyers who view it as an essential 
pre-requisite to state formation.  
The consequences of Germany’s desire for sovereignty have been mainly two-
fold. First, much significance has been attached to internal sovereignty, or in other words, 
                                                                                                                                                  
 
34 John C. Calhoun, A Disquisition on Government and a Discourse on the Constitution and 
Government of the United States (Richard K. Cralle ed., 1851), at 146. 
 
35   Which provides that “All public authority emanates from the people. It shall be exercised by the 
people through elections and referendums and by specific legislative, executive and judicial bodies.” All 
translations of the German Basic Law are taken from Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, 
Official Translation (Press and Information Office, 1995). 
 
36   Julie Marie Bunck & Michael Ross Fowler, Law, Power and the Sovereign State: The Evolution and 
Application of the Concept of Sovereignty (1995), at 33. 
37Supra note 16.   
 
 
38   The distinction being made here is that the Kaiserreich and the Third Reich were sovereign states. 
By contrast, the Federal Republic of Germany was never a fully sovereign state.   8 
the state’s power to regulate its own affairs. Second, external sovereignty, or the state’s 
ability to act in the world arena, has been viewed as paramount. The word paramount is 
used intentionally to denote the sui generis nature of the German example because it is 
other states recognition of Germany as a sovereign state that has both formed and 
informed the German juridical debate over sovereignty. It is notable that prior to 
(re)unification, both West Germany and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) 
responded to the constraints enforced by limited sovereignty (West Germany to the Four 
Powers, the GDR to the Soviet Union) in a similar manner, albeit in different contexts and 
within different structural parameters.
39 External recognition of statehood was of 
paramount importance to each state. Social, cultural, political and historical factors have 
each contributed to what must be regarded as part of an evolution. In Germany, it is not 
conceptions of sovereignty that have changed, but the parameters. Thus, in 1990, when 
Germany was (re)unified, and the reserved rights of the Four Powers (France, the United 
Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States) were relinquished, German jurists, 
depending on their perspective, either felt that Germany had regained its sovereignty or 
that it had become sovereign for the first time.  
Ironically, this (re)assumption of sovereignty took place against the backdrop of 
European Monetary Union, which obligated some EU member states to cede sovereignty 
over their respective currencies, and, more generally speaking, globalization, where 
international obligations were increasingly placing limitations on the sovereignty of 
states. A further irony is that as state sovereignty has evolved into a relative concept; a 
significant portion of the German juridical debate has responded by over-emphasizing the 
sovereignty of the German state, placing it over and above Germany’s European and 
international commitments as part of a crusade against the ‘withering away’ of the state. 
The issue of loss informs much of the debate concerning the effects of European 
integration on sovereignty, a trend that goes hand in hand with the debate concerning the 
effects of globalization on the sovereign state.
40 What is significant in the German 
example is the obsession by German jurists with the issue of the ultimate arbiter in 
relation to the impact of European law on German law. Indeed, the very wording, the 
impact of European law on German law could be attributed to those jurists who regard 
                                                 
 
39   Supra note 16. 
 
 
40   See, e.g., Sassen, supra note 9.   9
EU law and German law as representing two separate legal orders. Those jurists who 
regard European integration as giving rise to one legal order represent a minority in a 
debate that, as I have noted elsewhere, is extremely divisive.
41 Indeed, the pragmatic view 
of ‘pooled’ sovereignty
42 in light of the increasing interdependence between states
43 at the 
supra-national level represents a conceptualization of sovereignty that is underrepresented 
in the German legal debate.
44  
The absence of pragmatism can be partially explained by the historical context. 
For instance, the Treaty of Versailles (1919) was regarded as a provocation by even the 
most levelheaded German jurists because it severely constrained Germany’s powers. 
Herman Heller, for example, claimed the Treaty left the German people ‘defenseless and 
plundered,’
45 and fuelled appeals for a strong version of German nationalism, upon which 
Hitler was only too willing to capitalize. 
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate a relatively recent decision of the German 
Federal Constitutional Court, the so-called ‘Bananas Judgment’, in order to assess the 
concept of sovereignty in the German juridical debate concerning the European 
integration project.  
  
  A.  Etatism vs Post-Etatism 
 
The German debate over the need for a European constitution is a good illustration of the 
extent to which two schools of thought both form and inform the discussion concerning 
the European integration project. The first school of thought provides that the European 
Union is unable to have a constitution because it is not a state.
46  According to this view 
                                                 
 
41   Miriam Aziz, Sovereignty Lost, Sovereignty Regained? The European Integration Project and the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht, RSC Working Paper No. 2001/31 (2001). 
 
42 See supra note 12, MacCormick, The Maastricht-Urteil and MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty. 
 
43   See, e.g., the concept of interdependence sovereignty espoused by Krasner, supra note 11. 
 
44   See Schwarze, Concept and Perspectives and Grimm, Die Zukunft der Verfassung, supra note 13 at 
279. 
 
45   See Peter C. Caldwell, Popular Sovereignty and the Crisis of German Constitutional Law. The 
Theory and Practice of Weimar Constitutionalism, at 128 (Duke University Press, 1997), who refers to 
Heller’s critique of Versailles. See Meyer, Die politischen Ideenkrise der Gegenwart (1926) in Hermann 
Heller, Gesammelte Schriften I: 359 (1926).  
 
 
46   See Dieter Grimm, Does Europe need a constitution?, ELJ 282 (1995).   10 
the state is both the object and the prerequisite of a constitution.
47 Moreover, there must 
be people who are state bearers of authority (Staatsvolk) to reflect upon a constitution. 
The EU lacks the pouvoir constituant because there is no a European Staatsvolk. The 
second school of thought, which I have elected to entitle ‘post-etatistic,’ supports the view 
that the existence of a political community is a prerequisite for a constitution. Thus, the 




The two schools of thought also have different interpretations of the concept of 
sovereignty. According to the first view, legal sovereignty is linked to the nation-state. 
The EU is viewed as ‘supra-national’ or even intergovernmental
49 and only legitimate to 
the extent that it provides a mechanism for furthering the interests of the nation-state, 
including those associated with fundamental rights.
50 The second view is arguably 
tantamount to a cosmopolitan position given that it is intrinsically a ‘post-sovereignty’ 
position. Accordingly, rights are not tied to culture or territory; thus, it is perfectly 
possible to have a legal system that is transnational or ‘trans’ state-like and that is focused 
on the interpretation and elaboration of these fundamental principles. 
The debate over the ultimate arbiter in Germany is underpinned by a tension 
between these two versions of events, which are retold in what Ladeur has referred to as 
a, “traditionally state-determined discourse.”
51 Thus, in the ‘etatist’ view, although EC 
law prevails over national law, there are exceptions. The ‘post-etatist’ view categorically 
accepts the order of precedence of EC law. Academic opinion amongst jurists in Germany 
is divided between these two positions with little, if any, consensus, conceptually 
                                                 
 
47   See Isensee, Staat und Verfassung in Handbuch des Staatrechts, supra note 30 at § 13, par 1. See also 
Christoph Dorau and Philipp Jacobi, The Debate over a ‘European Constitution’: Is it Solely a German 
Concern? 6 EPL 413, 416 (2000). 
 
48   See Konrad Hesse, Grundzüge des Verfassungsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, § 1 para. 17 
(1993). 
 
49   See, for example, Matthias Pechstein and Christian Koenig who do not regard the European Union as 
an international organisation in the proper sense of the word but merely a loose framework within which 
states make international agreements. See Die Europäische Union. Die Verträge von Maastricht und 
Amsterdam, at 275 (2000). 
 
50   See below. 
 
 
51   Karl-Heinz Ladeur, Towards a Legal Theory of Supranationality – The Viability of the Network 
Concept, 3 ELJ 33, 34 (1997).   11
speaking.
52 Indeed, each position represents a competing school of thought in a debate 
that is highly vitriolic, defensive, confrontational and rhetorical, the staples of a legal 
debate, one might say. However, the way in which the main protagonists of each school of 
thought claim to possess the ultimate truth does little to foster open debate and even less 
to discount the accusation that the protagonists are in fact polemicists disguised as legal 
scholars. 
This issue is particularly problematic because it is difficult to ascertain the extent 
to which the legal reasoning of the debate is informed by the backgrounds, or 
socialization of its protagonists. For instance, it comes as no surprise that former judges 
of the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”)
53 and former officials of the European 
Commission
54 or the European Parliament
55 are at loggerheads with former judges of the 
BVerfG
56 over the interpretation of the effect of European integration on the German 
legal order. This division among former judges of the various judicial bodies contributes 
to the perception that participants in the German juridical debate are either ‘pro’ or 
‘contra’ European integration and draws attention to the politicization of the debate, but 
does little to dispel doubts about its ideological foundations. The distinction between an 
‘etatist’ and a ‘post-etatist’ model should not be equated with the distinction between 
‘pro’ the European Union and ‘contra’ the European Union. The ‘pro’ or ‘contra’ 
terminology is inherently ideological and therefore has no place in a legal academic 
discussion of the project of European integration. The purpose of the next section is not to 
present decisions of the German Federal Constitutional Court concerning European 
integration in terms of decisions ‘for’ or ‘against’ the EU, but to evaluate the 
Constitutional Court as an institutional actor that is instrumental in the German debate 
over European integration.  
 
  B. A Brief Overview of the Jurisprudence of the Bundesverfassungsgericht 
Concerning European Integration 
                                                 
 
52   Pro the BVerfG being the ultimate arbiter Rupert Scholz, Europäische Union und 
Verfassungsreform, 46 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1690 (1993) and Contra Günter Hirsch, 27-51 Neue 
Juristische Wochenschrift 2457 (1996). See also an article by the latter, a former judge at the ECJ: Günter 
Hirsch in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 9.10.1996, at p. 15.  
 
53   Such as Günter Hirsch and Manfred Zuleeg. 
 
54   Ingolf Pernice. 
 
55   Roland Bieber. 
 
 
56   Such as Paul Kirchhof and Dieter Grimm.   12 
 
The jurisprudence of the Bundesverfassungsgericht on European integration is 
prolific; a detailed appraisal of its decisions would not only be impossible for reasons of 
economy but also would have little relevance to the discussion at hand. It suffices to say 
that the cases referred to below must be viewed in relation to the arguments advanced in 
this article and not as an exhaustive evaluation of the BVerfG’s jurisprudence regarding 
European integration.
57 
In its Solange I decision,
58 the court held that until the EC has proven its capacity 
to provide adequate protection of basic rights, the Federal Constitutional Court would 
remain the ultimate arbiter concerning issues of human rights and would assess the level 
of protection afforded to human rights in specific cases.
59 In Solange II,
60 the Court held 
that the EC had established a level of protection of human rights that was commensurate 
with the fundamental rights enshrined in the German Basic Law, which meant that the 
BVerfG relaxed its jurisdictional monopoly over questions of basic rights. As long as the 
general level of protection was secured by the ECJ, the BVerfG would not review the 
level in specific cases. The fundamental rights issue was not directly relevant for the 
Maastricht judgement.
61 Prior to the Banana case, one could only speculate as to the 
effect of the judgment on the human rights issue. One reading of the case
62 is that the 
BVerfG reaffirmed the position it adopted in Solange II, that is to say that the BVerfG 
would only look at general cases in the event of a decrease in the general level of human 
rights protection. It was this interpretation of the Maastricht decision
63  that was of 
                                                 
 
57 See, however Kokott, supra note 14 at 77 – 131 and also recent decisions of the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht in which it has upheld its prerogative to apply the German standards in extreme 
cases; after the most recent decisions, however, it appears that this claim is of a rather theoretical nature; see 
judgments of the Bundesverfassungsgericht of July 6, 2000 in 53 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 3124 
(2000) and of September 1, 2001 in 12 Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht [EuZW] 255 (2001). 
 
58   Decision of May 29, 1974, BVerfGE 37, 271. 
 
59   Author’s own emphasis. 
 
60   Decision of October 22, 1986, BVerfGE 73, 339. 
 
61 Decision of October 12, 1993, BVerfGE 89, 155 or Brunner v. European Union Treaty, 1 Common. 
ML. Rev. 57 (1994). It is important to point out that the Maastricht decision was based on arguments 
concerning democratic legitimacy and competence-competence. The human rights nexus of the case is 
obiter dicta only. 
62 Indeed, several readings of the case exist. For example, Manfred Zuleeg, The European Constitution 
under Constitutional Constraints: The German Scenario, 22 EL. Rev. 19 (1997); Paul Kirchhof, Die 
Gewaltenbalance zwischen staatlichen und europäischen Organen, 20 JZ 965 (1998), translated in Paul 
Kirchhof, The Balance of Powers Between National and European Institutions, 5 ELJ 225 (1999). 
 
63 A plethora of interpretations of the effect of the Maastricht decision were offered as regards the human 
rights issue. See Zuleeg, id., for some of them.   13
particular significance to the BVerfG’s most recent jurisprudence on European 
integration, namely, the Banana case.
64  
The purpose of this article is to examine the German Federal Constitutional 
Court’s Banana judgement in the context of the analytical framework within which the 
role and the position of the state in the process of European Integration is customarily 
interpreted by the main protagonists of the German legal academic debate. References to 
previous BVerfG cases concerning European Integration shall be made for the purpose of 
the discussion only. 
 
 
III. THE BANANA JUDGMENT 
 
A.  The Common Organization for the market in Bananas 
 
The amount of judicial attention that has been designated to the importation of 
bananas verges on the extraordinary.
65 Indeed, the importation of bananas into the EU has 
been examined under national,
66 European,
67 and international law,
68 has secured a place 
on the judicial agenda for almost ten years, and shows no signs of disappearing. The 
issues raised by the regulation such as protectionism – legitimate or otherwise
69  – are 
                                                 
64 Decision of June 7, 2000, 2 BvL 1/97 or 53 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 3124 (2000). 
65 See, for example, Joel P. Trachtman, Bananas, Direct Effect and Compliance, 10 EJIL 655 (1999). See 
also Christoph U. Schmid, A Disappointing Retreat?, 1 ELJ 95 (2001). 
66 As the case at hand illustrates. For a summary of the original application of the Frankfurt Administrative 
Court to the German Constitutional Court, see VG Frankfurt a.M., 8 Eu.Z.W. 182 (1997). 
67 See Case C-280/93, 1994 E.C.R. I-4973; Atlanta, Case C-466/93, 1995 E.C.R. I-3799; T-Port III, Case C-
364/95, Case C-365/95; T-Port GmbH & Co. K.G. v. Bundesanstalt für Landwirtschaft und Ernährung, 
Case C-68/95, 1996 E.C.R. I-6065.  
68 At the level of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), a dispute settlement procedure initiated by some 
Latin American States and the United States in 1996 was resolved by a decision by the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Body of 25.9.1997 which held that the Regulation breached several articles of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1994) (GATT) and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). 
See, inter alia, European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas-
Complaint by the United States WT/DS27/R/USA (22 May 1997). Moreover, on April 12, 1999 a WTO 
dispute settlement panel issued a series of decisions in which it attempted to resolve the conflict 
successfully: European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas-
Recourse to Art. 21.5 by Ecuador WT/DS27/RW/ECU (12 April 1999), European Communities-Regime for 
the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas-Recourse to Article 21.5 by the European Communities 
WT/DS27/RW/EEC (12 April 1999). For the reports see generally http://www.wto.org. 
 
 
69   Independent studies by the World Bank have, for example, concluded that the restrictions concerning 
importation of bananas into the EU costs the consumer approximately 2,3 Billion Dollars a year by virtue of   14 
outside the scope of this article given that they are essentially trade issues.
70 A brief 
exposition of the trade nexus of the case is, however, necessary.  
The German case arose as a consequence of EC Regulation 442/93 (hereinafter 
referred to as the “Regulation”), the objective of which was to create a single market in 
bananas.
71 This required replacing four types of national trade regimes: those of banana 
producers that effectively excluded all imports; those that protected imports from former 
colonies;
72 those that imported ‘dollar’ bananas subject to a tariff; and Germany’s trade 
regime that imported bananas without a tariff. In short, the Regulation provides for price 
supports for EU bananas under the Common Agricultural Policy (“CAP”), duty-free 
access for African Caribbean and Pacific (“ACP”)
73 bananas and a tariff-quota for ‘dollar’ 
bananas.
74 Licenses are required to import both ACP and ‘dollar’ bananas and some 
‘dollar’ banana licenses were reserved for ACP importers. In view of the fact that ‘dollar’ 
bananas are much cheaper to produce, only the 200% tariff is prohibitive. Germany was 
particularly affected by the Regulation because it had no producers or colonies to protect 
and because the price increase was greatest not to mention the fact that more bananas per 
capita are consumed in Germany than in any other EU member state. This was the reason 
why the German government opposed the protectionist line on ‘dollar’ bananas and voted 
against the Regulation.
75 
The issue that the second senate of the BVerfG was asked to adjudicate by a 
Frankfurt Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgericht or “VG”) was whether the 
                                                                                                                                                  
the prices, which are artificially high. See Brent Borrell, EU Bananarama III, Policy Research Working 
Paper No. 1386 (1994). 
 
70   See generally Ulrich Everling, Will Europe Slip on Bananas? The Bananas Judgement of the Court 
of Justice and National Courts, 33 CMLRev 401 (1996) and also Par Paul Cassia & Emmanuelle Saulnier, 
L’imbroglio de la banane, 411 RMCUE 527 (1997). 
 
71   I would like to thank Alasdair Young for his comments regarding this section. 
 
72  Or a combination with the first group. 
 
73  As provided for under the Lomé Convention which provides special concessions to African, 
Caribbean and Pacific States (ACP). The current convention is Lomé IV, 1991 O.J. L229 and 1998 O.J. 
L156, at Protocol 5 for the rules governing bananas. See Fiona Smith, Renegociating Lomé: the impact of 
the World Trade Organization on the European Community’s development policy after the Banana’s 
conflict, 25 E.L.Rev. 247 (2000). 
 
74  One fixed-value tariff is equivalent to approximately 20% for imports within the quota and one fixed 
value tariff of about 200% for imports beyond the quota.  
 
 
75   See Franz Mayer, Grundrechtsschutz gegen europäische Rechtsakte durch das BVerfG: Zur 
Verfassungsmäβigkeit der Bananenmarktordnung, 22 Eu.Z.W. 685 (2000).   15
application of the European Regulation






  B.  The Banana Case: An Overview 
 
The case at hand involved a challenge by a group of third-country banana 
importers
78 before a Frankfurt Administrative Court over the constitutionality of the 
conditions on trade imposed on third countries by the Regulation. Prior to the enactment 
of the Regulation, the majority of bananas on the market in Germany originated from 
third countries.  
The VG first referred the case first to the ECJ, asking it to ascertain the validity of 
the Regulation under EC law. The ECJ upheld the validity of the Regulation.
79 
The VG then referred the case to the BVerfG, asking it to consider whether the 
Regulation violates provisions contained in the German Basic Law. In particular, it was 
argued that the Regulation infringes upon the importing firms’ right to property (Article 
14 (1) of the Basic Law),
80 the free exercise of a profession (Article 12 (1) of the Basic 
Law)
81 and the equality provision (Article 3 (1) of the Basic Law).
82 As a result of the 
Regulation, the plaintiffs could, as of July 1, 1993, only import 50% of the original 
amount they had imported into Germany. This violated their rights because of the absence 
                                                 
 
76  Council Regulation 404/93/EEC of 13 February 1993, 1993 O.J.E.C. L.47 (pp. 1-11) (on the 
common organization of the market in bananas); Council Regulation 1442/93/EEC of 10 June 1993, 1993 
O.J.E.C. L.142. 
 
77   See 2 BvL 1/97, supra note 64. 
 
78   Referred to as the Atlanta Group. 
 
79   Atlanta, supra note 67. 
 
80   Article 14 (1) expressly provides that “Property and the right of inheritance are guaranteed. Their 
content and limits are determined by the laws.” See Basic Law, supra note 30. See generally Sabine 
Michalowski & Lorna Woods, German Constitutional Law: The Protection of Civil Liberties 299 – 312 
(1999). 
 
81 Article 12 (1) expressly provides that “All Germans have the right freely to choose their trade, 
occupation, or profession, their place of work, and their place of training. The practice of trades, 
occupations and professions may be regulated by or pursuant to a law.” See Basic Law, supra note 30. See 
Michalowski & Woods, id., at 299-312. 
 
 
82   Article 3 (1) expressly provides that “All persns shall be equal before the law.” Basic Law, id.   16 
of an interim regulation (Űbergangsregelung), which should have been enacted according 
to the principle of proportionality.
83  
The basis of the VG’s application to the BVerfG was that – and indeed this was 
the crux of the plaintiffs’ argument – the ECJ did not sufficiently or adequately protect 
human rights and the public international law obligations arising out of GATT, or in the 
alternative, that the conduct of the European legislature was outside the ambit of 
provisions contained in the EC Treaty, which raises the issue concerning boundaries of 
the order of precedence (Anwendungsvorrang) inherent to EC law.
84 In the VG’s opinion, 
a consequence of the Maastricht decision was that the BVerfG secured evaluative 
jurisdiction (Prűfungskompetenz) and the competence to set aside or nullify 
(Verwerfungskompetenz) European legal instruments on the grounds of 
unconstitutionality, which it exercises in co-operation with the European Court of Justice. 
85   
 
During the course of the somewhat lengthy proceedings,
86 the BVerfG drew the VG’s 
attention
87 to a decision reached by the ECJ on November 26, 1996, in which it upheld an 
obligation by the Commission to enact interim measures (Übergangsmaβnahmen).
88 The 
BVerfG held that had the VG assessed the effect of the T-Port decision correctly, it would 
have withdrawn its reference to the BVerfG on the grounds of inadmissibility, particularly 
as the decision involved a thorough evaluation of fundamental rights in the EU.
 89  
Needless to say, this human rights audit culminated in a finding that fundamental rights 
were sufficiently protected by the EU.  
In refusing to withdraw its application, the President of the VG replied to the 
BVerfG’s letter by stating that Article 30 of the Regulation did not offer any relief of the 
violation of human rights. The sanctions offered by the decision of the ECJ were not 
                                                 
 
83   See para 40 of the decision, supra note 64, in which the court refers to a previous decision of the 
BVerfG: BVerfGE 58, 300 (351). 
 
84  See para 30 of the decision, supra note 64. 
 
85   See supra note 60. 
 
86   Which lasted almost four years, which has been interpreted by some commentators as stalling tactics 
in view of the possible reticence of some judges to avoid dealing with a politically sensitive issue. See 
Mayer, supra note 75, at 686. 
 
87   In a letter dated March 26, 1997. 
 
88   As provided by Council Regulation of 13 February 1993, supra note 76, at Article 30. 
 
 
89   See supra note 64, para 49 of the decision.   17
specific but general in nature.
90 It is interesting to note, that the President of the VG not 
only incorrectly interpreted the T-Port decision, but that he also elected to reply to the 
BVerfG’s letter without consulting the rest of the Chamber. The procedural rules provide 
that the entire chamber should have replied to the BVerfG’s letter. The failure of the 
President to consult the Chamber contributed to the finding that the application was 
inadmissible on formal, procedural grounds.
91  
According to the BVerfG, fundamental rights in the European Communities, as 
the ECJ’s decisions indicate, are sufficiently protected.
92 Moreover, this protection is 
commensurate with the protection guaranteed by the provisions of the German Basic 
Law. As long as this continues to be the case, the BVerfG shall not exercise its 
jurisdiction concerning the applicability of secondary EC law. Briefly stated, the term 
secondary EC law is used to denote those legal instruments
93 that derive their legitimacy 
from the EC Treaty
94 but that are separate, secondary forms of law.
95 The BVerfG shall 
therefore not review secondary EC law
96 unless the ECJ fails to protect fundamental 
rights to the degree envisaged in Solange II.
97   
 
It is important to draw attention to the fact that the BVerfG’s judgment was consistent 
with an amendment to the Basic Law (Article 23 (1) Sentence 1),
98 which was enacted 
prior to both the Maastricht decision and the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty and 
which provides constitutional limits to European integration. Thus, the EC Treaties and 
                                                 
 
90 See supra note 64, paras 50 and 51 of the decision. 
 
91 See supra note 64, para 67 of the decision. 
 
92   The BVerfG thereby reaffirmed its Solange II decision. See supra note 59 at 378-381. 
 
93 That is to say, regulations, directives and decisions. 
 
94   See Article 249 (ex Article 189) of the EC Treaty [TEC], consolidated version, 1997 O.J C 340/173. 
 
95 See generally Paul P. Craig and Gráinne De Búrca, EU Law (
3rd  ed.,2002). 
  96  Or “Solange [dies so ist…] wird das Bundesverfassungsgericht seine Gerichtsbarkeit über die 
Anwendbarkeit von abgeleitetem Gemeinschaftsrecht […] nicht mehr ausüben […] Vorlagen (von Normen 
des sekundären Gemeinschaftsrechts an das Bundesverfassungsgericht) […] sind deshalb unzulässig.” See 
supra note 64, para 59 of the decision. Here the court cross referred to its Solange II decision. See supra 
note 59. 
 
97   See supra note 64, para 60 of the decision. 
 
 
98   As amended on 21 December 1992. Article 23 (1) of the Basic Law expressly provides that “(1) To 
realize a unified Europe, Germany participates in the development of the European Union which is bound to 
democratic, rule of law, social, and federal principles as well as the principle of subsidiarity and provides a 
protection of fundamental rights essentially equivalent to that of this Constitution. The federation can, for 
this purpose and with the consent of the Senate, delegate sovereign powers. Article 79 (2) and (3) is 
applicable for the foundation of the European Union as well as for changes in its contractual bases and 
comparable regulations by which the content of this Constitution is changed or amended or by which such 
changes or amendments are authorized.” Basic Law, supra note 30.   18 
any secondary legislation arising therefrom should be read in the light of other provisions 
of the Basic Law, such as the provisions falling under the so-called ‘eternity clause,’
99 
which contains a reference to human dignity and the value of human life
100 as well as to 
the federal, democratic and social principles upon which the Federal Republic of 
Germany is founded.
101 The eternity clause provides that these principles may not be set 
aside by the legislature.
102 
In order for a challenge to succeed before the BVerfG, a court must prove that 
interpretation of European law, which includes the decisions of the ECJ taken after the 
Solange II decision, has evolved in such a way that the necessary level of protection for 
basic rights is not being met.
103 This necessitates reconciling basic rights protection at the 
national level with the European level according to the method envisaged by the BVerfG 
in Solange II. The BVerfG held that not only had the VG failed to undertake such an 
assessment but also the ECJ’s case law illustrated that basic rights are sufficiently 
protected at the level of the EU.
104 The court further held that the VG had misinterpreted 
the Maastricht decision.
105 
The questions addressed in the Maastricht decision do, to some extent, overlap 
with those raised in the Banana case. The judgements are, however, by no means 
interchangeable. Maastricht concerned the issue of the competence of the German state, 
under its constitution to ratify the Maastricht Treaty. By contrast, the Banana case was 
based on the issue of fundamental rights. Although these issues are substantively 
different, they both raise the question of the ultimate arbiter. 
 
 
IV.  THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE BANANA CASE 
                                                 
 
99 Article 79 (3) of the Basic Law. Id. 
 
100  Article 1 of the Basic Law. Id. 
 
101  See Article 20 of the Basic Law. Id. 
 
102In the event of conflict, the competing constitutional principles must be balanced in accordance with 
the principle of maximum effectiveness or ‘practical concordance’. See Hesse, supra note 48, §1 para. 28 
and §2 para. 72. For a succinct yet informative outline of the applicability of Article 23 of the Basic Law, 
see Christoph U. Schmid, From Pont d’Avignon to Ponte Vecchio: The Resolution of Constitutional 
Conflicts between the European Union and the Member States through Principles of Public International 
Law in 18 Yearbook of European Law 415, 418 – 419 (Piet Eeckhout and Takis Tridimas, eds., 1998).  
 
103 See supra note 64, para 62 of the decision.  
 
104 Such as the right to property, the right to economic activity, the freedom of association, the right to 
equality and the prohibition against arbitrary conduct, the freedom of faith, the protection of the family and 
the principle of proportionality. See supra note 64, para 58 of the decision. 
   19
 
It interesting to note that the ease with which the BVerfG dealt with the human 
rights issue in a case which was essentially based on competence - albeit obiter dicta – 
was noticeably absent in the Banana case. That is to say, that it elected not to address the 
issue of competence by way of obiter dicta in a case based on fundamental rights, a move 
which would have been in line with the tactics it adopted in its Maastricht decision. It is 
arguable that this was a deliberate move on behalf of the court to signal a stance vis à vis 
European integration that is, in contrast to the Maastricht decision, inherently positive. 
This would undoubtedly be explained by the absence of the infamous architect of the 
Maastricht judgment, Paul Kirchhof
106 who retired from the BVerfG prior to the 
judgment and whose particular understanding of the German state informed much of the 
BVerfG’s case law regarding European integration. Kirchhof is all too often demonized in 
the general legal debate concerning European integration.
107 Indeed, references to 
Kirchhof in this article are not designed to perpetuate this practice. They are made to 
outline the analytical context of the German juridical debate over European integration 
within which Kirchhof enjoys considerable standing. Indeed, his theory of the state exerts 
considerable influence over German constitutional theory and German constitutional 
lawyers.
108 To demonize him or dismiss him as anachronistic is to underestimate the 
weight of a particular strand of German state theory that continues to inform the German 
legal response to the challenge of European integration. Be that as it may, if, as has been 
suggested by some, the Banana decision is to be regarded as being as ‘pro’ EU as the 
BVerfG was able to be under the circumstances, it was not necessarily because Kirchhof 
retired before the judgment was reached. First, it is likely that in reaching its decision, the 
BVerfG was all too aware that the Regulation would eventually have to be amended in 
light of the rulings of the World Trade Organization (WTO) that consistently uphold US 
challenges.
109 Secondly, the optimism which the ‘pro’ EU position vis à vis the Banana 
decision may - or may not - engender must, however, be viewed in light of certain 
qualifications that the BVerfG elected to attach to its ‘pro’ EU stance by way of 
                                                                                                                                                  
 
105 See supra note 64, para 64 of the decision. 
 
106 In the sense that he was the reporting judge. 
 
107 That is to say both within and outside of Germany. 
 
108 Indeed, his commentary on state theory and practice. See Isensee and Kirchhof, Handbuch des 
Staatsrechts, supra note 30,  one of the leading, if not the authority on German Public Law. 
   20 
procedure, the co-operation relationship with the ECJ
110 and its particular interpretation of 
human rights. 
 
  A.  Review and Article 100 (1) of the Basic Law 
 
In essence, the court held in the Banana case that secondary European Community 
legislation is a matter for the ECJ and does not constitute an appropriate basis for review 
under Article 100 (1) of the Basic Law.
111 Ordinarily speaking, applications under Article 
100 (1) relate to the formal legislation arising out of the constitution both at the level of 
the Federation and of the individual Länder or States.
112 The Federal Constitutional court 
has the exclusive competence to adjudicate on the constitutionality of national laws.
113 An 
issue of central importance in the case concerned the appropriateness of the application of 
Article 100 (1) vis à vis secondary EC legislation. 
The VG’s position was that such measures do not fall under Article 100 (1)
114 and 
that it would be preferable to have a separate legal provision that would enable courts to 
consider the reviewability of secondary EC law. In the case at hand, the VG was, 
however, willing to apply Article 100 (1) in order to fill the gap.
115 The BVerfG’s 
response was that applications under Article 100 (1) are inadmissible unless the level of 
the protection of fundamental rights protection generally sinks.
116 The BVerfG thereby 
rejected the VG’s argument in favor of establishing a separate legal procedure to review 
secondary EC legislation.  
                                                                                                                                                  
 
109 Rulings with which the EU has, as yet, failed to comply. See US warns of sanctions over EU’s 
banana import plans, Financial Times, February 23, 2001 at 1. 
 
110 Which it first referred to in its Maastricht decision. 
 
111 Which expressly provides that “Where a court considers that a statute on whose validity the court's 
decision depends is unconstitutional, the proceedings have to be stayed, and a decision has to be obtained 
from the State court with jurisdiction over constitutional disputes where the constitution of a State is held to 
be violated, or from the Federal Constitutional Court where this Constitution is held to be violated. This 
also applies where this Constitution is held to be violated by State law or where a State statute is held to be 
incompatible with a federal statute.” Basic Law, supra note 30. 
 
112 See supra note 64, para 30 of the judgement. 
 
113 Indeed, the competence to set aside a law which is held not to conform with the Basic Law – in itself 
a form of ‘checks and balances’ - is regarded as being part and parcel of the Rechtsstaat principle. See Ingo 
von Münch and Philip Kunig, Grundgesetz Kommentar, Article 100 (1) at Rdnrs 2 and 3 (1996). 
 
114 See supra note 64, para 30 of the decision. 
 
115 See supra note 64, para 31 of the judgement. 
 
 
116 A position which is supported by legal academic opinion. See, Münch and Kunig, supra note 113, at 
Rdnr 13.   21
The BVerfG’s response left little doubt about its interpretation of the 
application of Article 100 (1) in that it reinforced the position it adopted in the Maastricht 
case,
117 that is to say that it regards those acts of the Community that have been 
transposed into German law as reviewable. Significantly, the BVerfG effectively avoided 
moving towards a realization of the vision that it initially outlined in the Maastricht case, 
the so-called ‘co-operation relationship’ which, according to the BVerfG, constitutes the 
supervisory jurisdiction concerning the protection of fundamental rights that it exercises 
in co-operation with the ECJ.
118 
 
  B.  The  Co-operation Relationship between the BVerfG and the ECJ 
 
It is arguable that the co-operation relationship between the BVerfG and the ECJ 
has remained only a vision given the absence of guidelines or a consensus as to how it 
ought to function.
119 The relationship is, however, not as nebulous as it appears because it 
is the BVerfG that decides how and when the co-operative relationship ought to be 
exercised. It is here where what appears to be a matter of mere procedure in effect gives 
support to an interpretation of the co-operation relationship that favors the German 
Federal Constitutional Court.  Thus, while it appears to be inclusive, it is effectually 
exclusive.  
This is particularly apposite given the court’s interpretation of Article 100 (1) of 
the Basic Law.
120 The Court could, after all, have elected to address the VG’s argument in 
favor of a separate legal procedure governing the reviewability of secondary EC 
legislation and thereby develop the co-operation relationship further instead of restricting 
itself to making a minor amendment to the language.
121 One potential explanation is that 
had the court addressed the issue of a separate procedure, it may have been forced to take 
into account a provision of the EC Treaty which is arguably the blue-print for a legal 
framework within which the co-operation between the BVerfG and the ECJ can most 
effectively take place, namely, the preliminary reference procedure whereby any national 
                                                 
 




119 See supra note 33. 
 
120 See supra note 117. 
 
 
121 Thus, in the Maastricht decision the court refers to a co-operation relationship to (or “zum”) the ECJ 
which it amends to with (or ‘mit’) the ECJ. See Mayer, supra note 75, at 687.   22 
court may refer a question to the ECJ concerning the interpretation of the EC Treaty and 
legislation arising from it (Article 234 EC Treaty).
122  
Indeed, it is of interest to note that the BVerfG has never addressed Article 234 
EC in the context of the co-operation relationship,
123 probably because to accept Article 
234 EC as underpinning the co-operative relationship would represent a concession to the 
view that the ECJ is the ultimate arbiter to the extent that an issue is based on the EC 
Treaty as opposed to the German Basic law. 
In the Banana judgment, the BVerfG in effect reserves the ultimate right to decide 
whether human rights at the level of the European Union are commensurate with the 
human rights standards provided for by the German Basic Law. Moreover, it is the 
BVerfG’s standard with regard to the level of human rights protection that prevails
124 - a 
form of ‘constitutional patriotism,’ in the sense that, with regard to human rights, there is 
‘no place like home.’
125 
The absence of a Charter of Fundamental Rights for the EU which is legally 
binding arguably justifies the move by a member state’s constitutional court to scrutinize 
human rights in the EU until, to paraphrase the Solange decision, they are adequately 
safeguarded at the EU level.
 126 What seems clear from the German Constitutional court 
decisions is that the constitutional courts of the member states remain the ultimate arbiters 
of the issue. This gives rise to the following question: to what extent, if at all, is this view 
premised on the view held by the judges that their legal systems are fundamentally and 
essentially distinct and must therefore remain ‘intact’ and ‘untouched’ against outside 
                                                 
 
122 Formerly Article 177 of the TEC. See David W. K. Anderson, References to the European Court 
(2
nd ed, 2002). 
 
123 As has been suggested by Everling, who interprets TEC Article 234 as the correct understanding of 
the co-operation relationship. See Ulrich Everling’s editorial in 8 EuZW 225 (1999). 
 
124 See supra note 64, para 31 of the decision and also para 60, line 13 where the court states that, “Das 
Bundesverfassungsgericht werde erst und nur dann im Rahmen seiner Gerichtsbarkeit wieder tätig, wenn 
der Europäische Gerichtshof den Grundrechtsstandard verlassen sollte, den der Senat in BVerfGE 73, 339 
(378 bis 381) festgestellt hat.” 
 
125 See below. 
 
 
126 Constitutional courts in other member states have also adjudicated on the issue of the most 
appropriate level of human rights protection. For example, the Italian Corte Costitutzionale, Decision of 
April 13, 1989, 232/89 Foro Italiano [Foro It. I] 1990, I, 1, 1855; and Zerini decision from 1994 (117/94 
Raccolta ufficiale delle sentenze e ordinanze delle Corte costituzionale [Racc. uff. corte cost.] 1994, 785); 
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influence, a notion which is reminiscent of the debates concerning the politics of 
identity and controversies governing models of integration? It is this tension that lies at 
the heart of the conflict between the two competing schools of thought concerning 
European integration, namely, the ‘etatistic’ school vs. the ‘post-etatistic’ school.  
With respect to the co-operative relationship, the two schools of thought may be 
contrasted as follows: according to the first view, the ECJ is granted a sense of delegated 
power in the mechanism for furthering the interests of the German state in co-operation 
with the BVerfG. The BVerfG, however, reserves the right to argue that the ECJ is not 
safeguarding fundamental rights sufficiently,
127 a position which is consistent with its 
Solange II and its Maastricht decisions. The ‘post-etatistic’ view provides a contrary 
interpretation by characterizing the ECJ’s position as weak and claiming that it does not, 
as yet, have an appropriate legal basis for such ‘cosmopolitan’ legal reasoning, something 
that the European Charter of Fundamental Rights may remedy.
128 The two schools of 
thought are based on separate premises and therefore reach different conclusions, which is 
not an uncommon phenomenon in academic debates. The juridical debate in Germany 
over the impact of European integration is, however, polarized to such an extent that it 
militates against an open discussion based on an exchange of ideas, primarily because the 
positions taken are adopted in such a way as to render them conceptually irreconcilable. 
Fundamental rights are a good illustration of the tension between the two schools 
of thought. The purpose of the next section is to assess the human rights nexus of the 
Banana case.  
 
  C.  A Human Rights Audit of the EU 
 
The human rights issues that arise as part of the Banana case are mainly two-fold. 
First, the appropriate human rights audit envisaged by the BVerfG must satisfy an 
evidentiary burden which may, in effect, be difficult, if not impossible for certain national 
courts to discharge,
129 given that it must include a detailed evaluation of the ECJ’s case 
law since 1986. It is questionable whether lower courts would have the resources to 
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undertake an audit such as that envisaged by the BVerfG. In effect, the BVerfG thereby 
sends a message to the lower courts not to refer cases based on fundamental rights. This 
does not, however, prevent courts from referring cases based on questions of competence. 
The main issues raised in the Maastricht decision are left open. Indeed, the BVerfG 
omitted to address the distinction between Maastricht and the Banana case, thereby neatly 
sidestepping the issue of competence altogether. 
Secondly, the BVerfG only refers to decisions of the ECJ case law since 1986. 
This is questionable for a number of reasons. First, whereas the decisions of the ECJ since 
1986 illustrate the increasing nexus of human rights in the EU, and by no means indicate 
a substantive inadequacy of the rights adjudicated upon, the rights jurisprudence of the 
ECJ is selective, not comprehensive. Indeed, the court has had very little to go on until 
now concerning human rights notwithstanding the fact that the EC Treaty does contain 
some basic rights.
130 Be that as it may, the BVerfG’s reference to the case law of the ECJ 
as an indicator of the level of the protection of fundamental rights in the EU is by no 
means consistent with its previous practice, a matter that the tenor of the Banana 
judgment does little to underscore. Indeed, in Solange I, the BVerfG neglected to refer to 
the Nold decision of the ECJ that had been decided two weeks earlier and in which the 
ECJ explicitly underlined that fundamental rights belong to the general principles of EC 
law and that it would draw on the common constitutional traditions of the member states 
as a source of inspiration.
131 One wonders to what extent a re-affirmation by the BVerfG 
of the line it took in Solange II, is part of a principled approach, and if so, what are the 
principles that permit the BVerfG to vest its trust in the ECJ vis à vis human rights in 
some of its judgments but not in others? The difficulty of ascertaining the nature of the 
principles upon which the BVerfG considers the decisions of other institutional actors in 
the European integration process is further illustrated by the BVerfG’s failure to address 
the human rights record of the other EC institutions in the Banana case.  
It is arguable that a human rights audit ought to include an assessment of 
legislative acts that have been passed by all EC institutions, that is to say, it ought to look 
beyond the jurisprudence of the ECJ. It is submitted that a thorough human rights audit of 
the EU would necessitate a panoramic audit of the EC institutions as regards basic rights, 
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something that it had in fact undertaken in is previous decision in the Solange II case in 
which it not only referred to the fundamental rights jurisprudence of the ECJ but also 
drew attention to the Common Declaration of the European Parliament, the Council and 
the Commission of the European Communities of April 5 1977 regarding fundamental 
rights and the Declaration of the European Council on Democracy of April 7 and 8, 
1978.
132 It is of further interest to note that the BVerfG also failed to refer to the decision-
making process of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights
133 signed in December at 
the Nice Summit,
134 which is questionable because a human rights audit ought to be 
prospective as well as retrospective.
135 
 
Fundamental rights provide a useful illustration of the tension between the two 
schools of thought given that their protection is viewed by some as being the role of 
‘homogenous constitutions,’ that is to say, the constitutions of the member states. To what 
extent, however, is this premised on an essentialist conception of human rights? The 
‘etatist’ view emphasizes the distinctiveness of the state that it perceives as being based 
on a Staatsvolk
136 and a culture, defined in terms of language, religion, art and history.
137 
This distinctiveness is, however, instrumentalized in order to draw boundaries that must 
be protected in the face of European integration. Indeed, law is viewed as pivotal in 
enabling the state to maintain an openness towards the European ideal (Europaoffenheit) 
while, at the same time, ensuring that the state does not ‘dissolve,’
138 a phenomenon that 
is referred to by some as Entstaatlichung, which clearly illustrates the defensive tenor of 
the ‘etatist’ position
139 despite appearances to the contrary. Thus, while appeals for the 
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competence of constitutional courts to listen to, question, and understand the debate over 
the European integration project
140 are articulated - thereby appearing to be inclusive – 
the position is, in effect, exclusive as it is precisely language and culture that are 
instrumentalized in order to demarcate boundaries and to erect borders.
141  
Aside from cultural influences, and the different historical processes that led to the 
drafting of the respective constitutions, the assumption which prevails is that the 
conceptions contained therein are so distinct or ‘essential’ that they merit vigorous 
protection, a position which is supported by certain strands of state theory. Thus, Hegel 
writes of the special historical role of people in history,
142 which is a consequence of the 
dialectical development of Spirit. There are the Völkergeister,
143 a term which denotes the 
special differentiated modes of the existence of people, that is to say, there is such a thing 
as the ‘Germanness’ of Germans, the ‘Englishness of the English’ which plays a role on 
the stage of world history.
144 
To allow for ‘outside’ influences would further contribute to the ‘withering away’ 
of the state’s sovereignty. This is not a rejection of the universality of human rights but is 
premised on the position that some states protect human rights more vigorously than 
others. Moreover, - so the argument continues – some states have protected certain rights 
which are, as in the case of the protection of economic rights in the German Basic Law, 
for example, not to be found in the constitutions of other states, a position which must, in 
order to be understood more fully, be viewed in relation to the context of the German 
juridical debate concerning European integration. The purpose of the next section is to 
assess to what extent there is a correlation between the concept of a unitary, homogenous 
state and the juridical debate over European integration, which its proponents seek to 
ensure is also unitary and homogenous as opposed to accommodating a plurality of views. 
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IV. THE GERMAN JURIDICAL DEBATE CONCERNING EUROPEAN 
INTEGRATION 
 
The judicial and extra-judicial debate in Germany over European integration has 
traditionally focused on the ultimate arbiter issue, as the BVerfG’s Solange I and II 
decisions illustrate. The juridical debate over normative clashes between European and 
national law in Germany has also secured a place in the public sphere. Indeed, the issues 
surrounding the Banana case were indirectly being discussed by judges – informed about 
the matter and otherwise – in national newspapers long before the decision was 
reached,
145 which lead some commentators to cast doubt as to the independence of one 
judge in particular, Paul Kirchhof, who, though not directly involved in the preparation of 
the Banana case, made it clear to the media which line the BVerfG would adopt regarding 
its adjudication. Questions concerning the independence of the judiciary undoubtedly 
arise and are, in this context, legitimate. The observations made in respect of this issue are 
two-fold.   
First, the position in Germany is that although judges of the BVerfG are permitted 
to make statements as academics,
146 they may not comment on cases that their chamber is 
adjudicating in a private capacity.
147  Indeed, it is difficult to interpret comments made by 
Kirchhof in an interview in light of his Professorial capacity,
148 an issue which has been 
noted by other commentators
149 and which was fiercely rebutted by Kirchhof.
150 Indeed, 
this Contretemps is a good illustration of how a conflict between the two schools of 
thought concerning the role of the German state in the European integration project can 
spill over into the personal sphere, that is to say that the border between remarks made ad 
rem and remarks made ad personam becomes easily blurred. Thus, the personal is, to a 
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limited extent, political, leading one to consider to what extent doubts raised as to the 
independence of the judiciary in relation to the BVerfG are founded. For reasons of 
economy, it is impossible to conduct a detailed discussion concerning the issue of judicial 
bias and the BVerfG as a whole. However, the issue in itself draws attention to the extent 
of the politicization of the judiciary that is undoubtedly connected to the particular notion 
of the Rechtsstaat in which courts, rather than politicians, make important choices 
regarding European integration.
151 This is particularly apposite in respect to the German 
Federal Constitutional court, whose role as an institutional actor has been the focus of 
considerable attention both within
152 and outside of academic circles.
153 The question 
concerning the extent to which the influence of the judiciary is inordinate is poised at the 
axis of the relationship between judges and democracy. There is no doubt that judges with 
dominant personalities can and have influenced the debate concerning European 
integration in Germany – and they may well continue to do so.
154 This statement is very 
much in line with the concept of new constitutionalism which provides for a model of 
‘checks and balances’ by constitutional courts regarding acts of parliaments and the 
notion of constitutional review as a method according to which parliamentary sovereignty 
is qualified.
155 This does, however, bring with it concomitant problems of democratic 
legitimacy if one accepts that judges and lawyers alike are supposed to be beneath the law 
and not, as the juridical debate concerning the project of European integration in 
Germany testifies, above it. It is arguable that the influence judges in Germany exert over 
the European integration debate is disproportionate.  
Whether they are former judges of the ECJ,
156 former officials of the European 
Commission
157 and the European Parliament,
158 or former judges of the BVerfG,
159 the 
respective backgrounds of the protagonists of the schools of thought are, to a certain 
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extent, relevant.  The debate over the effect of European integration on the German 
legal order is, however, not exclusively a product of the protagonists’ conditioning. The 
protagonists should not be discounted or discredited by virtue of their professional 
backgrounds; if anything, their experience provides an essential source of information for 
the debate. Moreover, the juridical debate concerning European integration ought to be 
structured in such a way as to facilitate open debate and the exchange of ideas and where 
dissent can be accommodated.  
The difficulty in the German context is two-fold. First, the debate is inherently 
confrontational. A model based on mediation would arguably be preferable. This would, 
however, involve challenging the terms of reference of the German debate as a whole, 
namely, law as a science or Rechtswissenschaft. This is the second point. Thus, 
definitions used regarding the academic discipline of law in Germany are derived from 
the terminology used in standard scientific enquiry inherent to the natural sciences. 
Scientific reasoning has traditionally been defined as being based on ordered, deductive 
thought as opposed to inductive knowledge acquired through belief or hearsay.
160 The 
implication is that scientists deal with the hard currency of facts as opposed to the loose 
change of opinions. The true scientist seeks truth – we might, however, reiterate Pontius 
Pilate in asking ‘what is truth?’ The ‘legal scientist’ would answer: ‘that which is shown 
to be true by way of scientific reasoning.’
161 There is, however, a basis of preference,
162 
namely, the ‘etatist’ or the ‘post-etatist’ basis, which creates a tension by way of a 
continuous fight for “core rationality” of the "scientific" enterprise concerning European 
integration. The word scientific appears in quotation marks as an acknowledgement of an 
integral element inherent to legal reasoning, namely, that of rhetoric. Legal argument is 
after all, designed to persuade. As regards the matter at hand, a debate which is 
underpinned by ideological differences concerning statehood is presented as a debate 
based on ‘scientific’ argument, or in other words, on legal positivist argument.
163 
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This undoubtedly contributes to erosion of the positivist view of legal reasoning, 
which is not in itself surprising, particularly given that the stakes in a debate about 
sovereignty are high. Thus, legal reasoning is, to some extent, instrumentalized in 
positing differing accounts of the fundamental legitimacy of political authority. Thus, for 
example, the ‘etatist’ school regards each constitutional court as having a particular 
notion of human rights that must be viewed in the ‘cultural context’ of its state. It goes 
one step further, however, to the extent that it uses the context argument to adopt what 
can only be described as a protectionist view, not only of rights, but also of values as a 
cultural heritage which may not be relinquished in spite of transfers of sovereignty to the 
supra-national level of the EU. This issue is pivotal to the discussion at hand as it 
underscores the ‘identity politics’ nexus of the sovereignty debate. Accordingly, the 
values which underpin human rights are regarded as being an intrinsic element of the 
state’s identity and it is this which is both articulated, not only in decisions of 
constitutional courts, such as the BVerfG, but also in the academic sovereignty debate as 
a whole. The terminology of the sovereignty debate, namely, whether pooled, shared, split 
or partial does little to draw attention to the fact that what is being fought over is the 
identity of the nation state. In other words: we (the nation-state) are who we say we are 
and we reserve the ability to define who we are.
164 We cannot permit others to define who 
we are, as defining our identity is our sovereign right. It is this tension upon which the 
two opposing perceptions of the relationship between EC law and national law are based 
in Germany, namely, whether they are ‘distinct.’ In other words: EC law and national law 
– one legal order or two? With regard to its corollary: one system of values or two? With 
regard to the EU, this formulation ought to be extended by substituting certain elements. 
Thus, one legal order or 16? The same applies to values: one system of values or 16? 
Philosophers would no doubt dismiss this as a reformulation of the age-old debate over 
universalism and relativism. For lawyers, the age-old debate has concrete implications, 
particularly given the fact that they are now faced with a Charter of Fundamental Rights 
post-Nice. The comments being made have been extended to the legal debate concerning 
European integration as a whole and are not limited to the German context. The German 
context is instructive, however, to the extent that it illustrates the underlying tension of 
the sovereignty debate as a whole, namely, identity politics. 
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The etatist state is delineated as the ‘ultimate boundary’ which refers to a state 
that may be open to the extent that international obligations must be honored but that is 
ultimately predicated on the consensus of all bodies of the state concerning the overall 
unity, dare one say, supremacy, of the state.
165 One is reminded of the writings of Carl 
Schmitt
166 that have arguably informed many of the BVerfG’s decisions,
167 including the 
Maastricht decision.
168 This is perhaps explained by the fact that the reporting judge in 
the latter case has a particularly impressive reputation as a Schmitt scholar. The influence 
of Schmitt on the jurisprudence of the BVerfG and indeed on German state theory as a 
whole
169 must not, however, be over-estimated or indeed exaggerated. The initial premise 
of the ‘etatist’ school, namely, that the legal strength of Europe lies in its states
170 is not a 
direct legacy of Schmitt. Be that as it may, the original basis and dependable guarantee of 
human rights of freedom secured by the rule of law, democratic legitimacy and the social 
equalization are the constitutional states which have bound their sovereignty in a 
constitutional law manner and have also laid it open to the influence of public 
international law.
171 Accordingly, whereas it is accepted that the state is not ‘an island,’
172 
the ground of applicability
173 regarding European Community law remains the German 
constitution. Indeed, for Kirchhof, the ultimate authority rests with what he refers to as 
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‘homogenous constitutions.’
174 Alternately put, this is tantamount to the view of the EU 
as a ‘union of sovereign states’ or the societas of states,
 175 a view that rests on the 
prevailing view of the EU as a supra-national organization that is very much in line with 
the ‘etatist’ school of thought. Accordingly, a constitution may not exist without a state. 
The EU is not a state; therefore it does not have a constitution. Law is thereby 
intrinsically linked to the state,
176 a view which is reminiscent of the classical ‘law 
without a state’ controversy of inter alia Weimar days
177 in which law was also viewed as 
being capable of existing both within and outside the state.
178 This is not to say that the 
state is viewed as anachronistic but that obligations arising as a consequence of the EU 
for instance qualify or to draw from MacCormick, ‘go beyond’ the state.
179 This 
contrasting theory of the state is predicated on the view of the state as porous, of being 
able to transcend its boundaries to the extent that it is not hermetically sealed, not fully 
independent, having endowed the EU with its sovereign authority, possibly pointing 
towards an emergent universitas.
180  
The reference made to the controversy of the Weimar days must be qualified to 
the extent that it is not made in order to portray Kelsen as a nationalist just as it is not 
aimed at portraying Egon Ehrlich as an internationalist. Instead, presenting them aids in 
distinguishing the two theories of the state outlined above on the basis of what one 
considers to be law. Thus, for Kelsen, the legal positivist stance provides that the law is 
constituted by the laws – for Ehrlich, this definition is too narrow and he elects to tease 
out a definition which includes other forms of social control, a stance which has been 
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taken up more recently by the legal pluralists.
181 Both views of law, however, are based 
on a theory of the state. For Kelsen, who adopts the hierarchical model for law inspired 
by his infamous Grundnorm, the state is not as impermeable or porous as it is in Ehrlich’s 
vision. Indeed, a hierarchical model for legal reasoning is rendered impossible by a legal 
pluralist perspective, which instead adopts a ‘heterarchy of diverse legal discourses.’
182 
There is a tendency, however, for the analyses that underpin legal pluralist accounts of 
law to underestimate the influence of the state on legal reasoning, which arguably derives 
from the unifying role that law played in state formation during the 19
th century. This 
role, however, was a relatively recent phenomenon as law originally transcended the 
boundary of the state.  
 
  A.  The Role of the Nation-State in Legal Reasoning 
 
Lawyers tend to think of law in terms of the nation-state. Indeed, the nation-state 
lies at the apex of legal reasoning.
183 Few legal disciplines encourage the legal profession 
to think beyond the limits of their national legal training, a notable exception being the 
discipline of public international law and comparative law, not to mention the recent 
development of supra-national legal bodies such as the arbitration authority established by 
the World Trade Organization.
184 Turning our attention to comparative lawyers,
185 there is 
no doubt that comparative law fosters the pursuit of ideas. The ratio of this discipline, 
however, remains the domestic legal system, which is first and foremost the point of 
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departure of this form of legal analysis that encourages a compartmentalized view of law 
along the lines of the nation-state. Jurists in the 17th and 18th centuries made use of the 
same legal grammar as part of the ius commune.
186 The common language was of course 
Latin, and the common heritage was Roman law,
187 which arguably constituted a unified, 
European culture.
188 The purpose of this next section is to evaluate the link between law 
and the nation-state and the concomitant effect on legal reasoning as a whole. 
 
  B.  Cosmopolitan Legal Reasoning? 
 
Justinian’s corpus iuris civilis and the first European university at Bologna, the so-
called universitas magistorum et scholarium, were pivotal in the gestation of law as a 
discipline
189 which was based on Roman and Canon law. Thus, law or legal reasoning 
was rooted in the notion that it was an application of legal principles instead of being 
territorially based within a context constituted by customary law, a project that we would 
now term as being a quest for universals.
190  
During the nineteenth century, German legal scholars studied Roman law and 
canon law and not local customary law, primarily due to the influence of the church.
191 
Lawyers who had completed their legal training in one country could occupy a chair in 
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another.
192 The German example is partly explained by the fact that there was no 
single, unified Germanic law or people at this time. Indeed, the German state as a single 
entity, namely, the German Reich, was only founded as late as 1871.
193 Thus, in 1495 
when the Reichskammergericht was established, the judges had to swear that they would 
uphold the common law of the Reich thereby acknowledging its primacy over the 
individual laws of the German territories. The reason for this is not exclusively to do with 
geography but also relates to the evolution of law as a science, namely, the 
implementation of rational, supra-regional, and neutral laws. The German jurists who had 
studied in Italy excelled in the formal rigor of legal reasoning which was not dependent 
on a local context
194 but on methodical, disciplined scientific reasoning.
195 To conclude: a 
common European legal culture which centered around a common legal science did once 
exist,
196 an issue which is overlooked by those jurists who, like Kirchhof, continue to 
argue in favor of the distinctiveness of their respective legal systems on the basis of 
cultural arguments.   
Legal reasoning according to principles was, however, reversed at the turn of the 
nineteenth century for it was at this time that perception of the nation-state defined by 
territorial, a priori elements prevailed. The instrumentalization of law for the purpose of 
state building is still very much part of the heritage of legal science. It is a heritage that 
must, however, not only be challenged, but must also be qualified in the face of the 
increasing inter-dependency of states in the light of globalization. A challenge could 
arguably draw on a number of sources. For instance, it could draw from Kant’s concept of 
the Weltbürger
197 in order to assess to what extent it gives rise to a possible corollary of a 
Weltjurist. According to Kant, the rationality behind an international community is based 
on a principle of right as opposed to a philanthropic principle.
198 Thus, this is not an 
ethical principle but a legal principle. Moreover, Kant maintains that if sovereign states 
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could agree on certain legal principles embodied in a binding international agreement, a 
new and just legal order for all mankind could develop.
199 This position is not dissimilar 
to the arguments taken up as part of the debate over cosmopolitan citizenship, which is 
based on a rejection of the Westphalian system of governance,
200 which recognizes the 
absolute sovereignty of states, 
201 and which was qualified by inter alia the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights that accords inalienable rights to people irrespective of 
membership of a state. Thus, cosmopolitan citizenship recognizes trans- or post-national 
agents.
202 With regard to legal theory, one is again reminded of Ehrlich’s emphasis on the 
independence of law from the nation-state; that is to say, law exists independently from 
the framework of the nation-state,
203 which can be contrasted with Kelsen, for instance, 
who believed that law could only be realized within the hierarchical structures of the 
state.
204 This tension underpins the current convergence debate in which the substantial 
degree of convergence between the legal systems of the member states,
205 not to mention 
mergers between those who serve them,
206 is assessed. The purpose of this article is not to 
evaluate the arguments for and against the convergence thesis, particularly given that its 
applicability is limited with respect to EU law. The terms of reference of the convergence 
debate are very narrow and are difficult to extend to the framework of the EU, 
particularly as the debate centers on the quest for a European Civil Code which is 
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premised on the law of obligations and the law of contract and ignores other aspects of 
private law,
207 most realms of public law,
208 and omits to address the EU dynamic as a 
whole. The foregoing discussion of the ius commune serves a particular purpose and is 
not intended to be evidence of any future trend. Rather, it is designed to illustrate the link 
between law and the nation-state that is regarded as intrinsic, particularly with respect to 
the German debate over European integration. In effect, this restricts the debate in such a 
way that alternative conceptions of law have no standing. For example, there is no room 
in the debate for a pluralist position in which agreements that extend the understanding of 
key concepts, such as fundamental rights, beyond national perceptions can be reached.
209 
The German debate is structured in such a way that these kinds of considerations are 
noticeably absent. This phenomenon is partly explained by the loyalty to the nation-state 
or what I have referred to elsewhere as Rechtspatriotismus,
210 which is encouraged by the 
method of legal education that constrains the study of law to the boundaries of the state. 
211   
The BVerfG Banana decision is a case in point. Although the BVerfG referred to 
the GATT in its judgment, it omitted to address the WTO, which is questionable, 
particularly given that the WTO has adjudicated on the banana regulation.
212 This is not 
mitigated by the fact that the VG did not refer to the WTO in its reference to the BVerfG, 
because the BVerfG has the discretion to consider any issue it regards as relevant to the 
adjudication of the reference made to it. One response to this argument would be to argue 
that making decisions about legal questions beyond its boundaries would extend beyond 
the court’s remit if not its competence. Indeed, why would the WTO be relevant to a case 
based on fundamental rights? It is not the role of the WTO to assess the compatibility of 
EC law with WTO law. As far as the WTO was concerned, the importation of bananas 
was a trade issue. Nevertheless, it is of interest to speculate to what extent the same 
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question would be decided differently ten years from now given the increasing evolution 
of what I term ‘multi-jurisdictionality.’
213 This appears to be a minor point, but serves to 
draw attention to the socialization of jurists. It may well be that, in the future, jurists will 
be encouraged to look beyond their domestic legal systems. Indeed this issue has already 
been addressed in the context of the use of comparative judicial decisions in human rights 
cases in jurisdictions, such as the case of the United Kingdom,
214 which have relatively 
recently incorporated human rights provisions that are significantly enforced. This would 
undoubtedly concur with the legal pluralist model, which accepts the position of the 
nation-state amongst other jurisdictions and, in fact, encourages taking decisions of other 




German lawyers have coveted sovereignty, because they see it as the essential 
characteristic of state formation and as key part of the difficult struggle they have faced in 
reconciling territory with identity. This struggle to reconcile territory and identity is 
particularly complicated given the existence of the two German states prior to 
reunification,
215 which were regarded as comprising two states in one nation.
216 
 
As a consequence of the Banana judgment, the BVerfG has sent a message to the lower 
courts not to refer cases based on fundamental rights. This does not, however, prevent 
courts from referring cases based on questions of competence. Thus, the main issues 
raised by the Maastricht decision are left open. In reaffirming its Solange II decision, the 
BVerfG does, however, outline its understanding of the co-operation relationship with the 
ECJ which it first referred to in Maastricht. Thus, the BVerfG reserves the right to assess 
the commensurability of fundamental rights protected in the EU with those enshrined in 
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the German Basic Law, which illustrates that it has a particular interpretation of the 
notion of co-operation. This interpretation of the relationship is, as this article has shown, 
a product of a German juridical debate over the European integration project that is 
underpinned by conflicts about the interpretation of the role of the state. Both the ‘etatist’ 
and the ‘post-etatist’ schools of thought outlined in this article are underpinned by the 
tension between a conception of sovereignty as ‘lost’ or ‘regained’, a binary combination 
which is inappropriate with respect to the process of European integration as a whole. 
Indeed, the German example can be extrapolated to the debates both within and outside 
the member states of the EU, albeit within different parameters and contexts. The 
importance of comparative work, particularly with respect to constitutional courts that 
belong to the dominant institutional actors in the project of European integration is hereby 
acknowledged. The lesson to be learned from the German example may be summarized 
as follows: the challenge is to what extent the juridical debate may be structured in such a 
way that it can accommodate a variety of views while at the same time acknowledging the 
controversial nature and the contestability of the European integration project. 
Indeed, the issue that the German juridical debate ought to address is the extent to 
which it can accommodate alternative positions such as a pragmatic legal pluralist 
position that regards sovereignty as shared and that upholds the necessity for 
jurisdictional dialogue and for some debate over the interpretation / specification of rights 
within specific contexts. This context would, however, be a German – European context 
in which German interests are also defined by Germany and not simply vice-versa. The 
status quo of the German juridical debate is, however, that it is confrontational enough 
that it inhibits a plurality of views, which detracts from the quality of the debate and 
makes it appear anachronistic, not only to Germany’s European counterparts but also to 
its own politicians.
217 Thus, while German jurists bicker about the terms of reference for 
the debate, politicians have seized the initiative in formulating a vision of Europe that 
represents a clear signal that the moment has come to move beyond classical conceptions 
of constitutionalism that are umbilically linked to the state.
218  This may serve as a 
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reminder that the contribution of constitutional judges to the debate over the European 
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